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This paper explores the role that recessions play in resource allo-
cation. The conventional cleansing view, advanced by Schumpeter in
1934, argues that recessions promote more eﬃcient resource allocation
by driving out less productive units and freeing up resources for better
uses. However, empirical evidence is at odds with this view: average
labor productivity is procyclical, and jobs created during recessions
tend to be short-lived. This paper posits an additional "scarring" ef-
fect: recessions "scar" the economy by killing oﬀ "potentially good
ﬁrms". By adding learning to a vintage model, I show that as a reces-
sion arrives and persists, the reduced proﬁtability limits the scope of
learning, makes labor less concentrated on good ﬁrms, and thus pulls
down average productivity. Calibrating my model using data on job
ﬂows from the U.S. manufacturing sector, I ﬁnd that the scarring eﬀect
is likely to dominate the conventional cleansing eﬀect, and can account
for the observed pro-cyclical average labor productivity.
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1“[Depressions] are the means to reconstruct each time the eco-
nomic system on a more eﬃcient plan. But they inﬂict losses
while they last, drive ﬁrms into the bankruptcy court...before
the ground is clear and the way paved for new achievement...”
Joseph A. Schumpeter (1934, p. 8)
“You must empty-out the bathing-tub, but not the baby along
with it.” Thomas Carlyle (1904, p. 368)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
How do recessions aﬀect resource allocation? This question has long at-
tracted the attention of economists. As far back as 1934, Schumpeter
advanced the view of “cleansing”: recessions are times when outdated or
relatively unproﬁtable techniques and products are pruned out of the pro-
ductive system. This view has been revived since the ﬁnding of Davis and
Haltiwanger (1992) that job reallocation in the U.S. manufacturing sector is
concentrated during recessions.1 Attempting to explain these cyclical pat-
terns, an assortment of theoretical work has arisen returning to the Schum-
peterian cleansing view.2 In their arguments, production units with diﬀerent
eﬃciency levels coexist due to certain reallocation frictions; when recessions
drive down proﬁtability, the least eﬃcient units should cease to be viable and
shut down,3 which frees up resources for more productive uses. Therefore,
setting aside the losses to particular businesses and individuals, reallocation
during recessions leads to greater eﬃciency in resource allocation.4
Despite solid theoretical reasoning, the cleansing view deviates from em-
pirical evidence in one important aspect – it implies countercyclical pro-
ductivity, while average labor productivity is in fact procyclical. This was
pointed out in Caballero and Hammour (1994), where they suggest that
the cleansing eﬀect may be dwarfed by other factors. Subsequent empirical
work has challenged the cleansing view from the creation side. For example,
1Similar evidence has also been found in the manufacturing sectors of Canada, Den-
mark, Norway and Colombia. See Davis and Haltiwanger (1999).
2See Hall (1992, 2000), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Caballero and Hammour
(1994, 1996), and Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001).
3These models assume perfectly competitive markets so that, as price takers, less eﬃ-
cient units are also less proﬁtable. However, with market power, a less eﬃcient unit can
be more proﬁtable. See Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2003).
4However, these papers not necessarily suggest that recessions lead to higher welfare.
In other words, it is likely that higher allocation eﬃciency and lower welfare eﬃciency
coexist during recessions.
2Bowlus (1993) and Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) ﬁnd that jobs cre-
ated during recessions tend to be short-lived, which inspired Barlevy (2002)
to question whether recessions encourage the creation of the most eﬃcient
units. However, although job destruction has been documented to be more
responsive to business cycles than job creation,5 few have yet asked the ques-
tion, “Are the production units cleared by recessions necessarily ineﬃcient?”
If not, then recessions might exacerbate the ineﬃciency of resource alloca-
tion instead of alleviating it as the conventional cleansing view suggests.6
In this paper, I propose a “scarring eﬀect” of recessions that plays against
the conventional cleansing eﬀect. I argue that while recessions drive out
some of the least productive ﬁrms, they also kill oﬀ “potentially good ﬁrms”;
the ﬁrms that have the potential to be proven eﬃcient in the future are forced
to leave due to reduced proﬁtability. The loss of potentially good ﬁrms leaves
“scars” when a recession arrives, and the “scars” deepen as the recession
persists. The presence of the scarring eﬀect revises the conventional view
of recessions as periods of solely healthy reallocation: the overall impact of
recessions on allocative eﬃciency should depend on the relative magnitude
of two competing eﬀects – cleansing and scarring.
Io ﬀer my explanation by combining the vintage model of Caballero and
Hammour (1994) with learning in the spirit of Jovanovic (1982). As in
their model, exogenous technological progress introduces a force of creative
destruction that drives in technologically sophisticated entrants to displace
older, outmoded ﬁrms.7 However, in my model, ﬁrms of the same vintage
also diﬀer in “type”: some are good and others are bad. Firm type can
represent the talent of the manager, or alternatively, the store location, the
organizational structure of the production process, or its ﬁtness to the em-
bodied technology. More importantly, these types are not observable ex
ante, but can be learned through experience. As information arrives, ﬁrms
choose to exit or stay, so that an additional learning force arises to keep
good ﬁrms and select out bad ﬁrms. Variations in aggregate demand serve
5Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) document that job destruction tends to be more volatile
than job creation in manufacturing sectors. The variance of destruction divided by the
variance of creation is 2.04 for the U.S., 1.49 for Canada, 1.0 for Denmark, 2.68 for the
Netherlands, 1.69 for Germany, 0.68 in Colombia, and 18.19 for the U.K..
6Ramey and Watson (1997) and Caballero and Hammour (1999) argue that job destruc-
tion threshold in recessions can be socially ineﬃcient. However, their cyclical implications
on productivity are the same as in the models of the conventional cleansing eﬀect: average
job quality goes up during recessions.
7The phrase “creative destruction” comes from Schumpeter (1939). It refers to the
birth and death of ﬁrms due to the introduction of new technology into the production
process.
3as the source of economic ﬂuctuations. As a negative demand shock strikes
and persists, the intensiﬁed creative destruction directs labor to younger,
more productive vintage, causing a cleansing eﬀect that raises average labor
productivity; meanwhile, the limited learning shifts labor toward bad ﬁrms,
creating a scarring eﬀect that pulls down average labor productivity. The
question then becomes, which one dominates? In Section 4, I calibrate my
model using data on U.S. manufacturing job ﬂows and study its quantita-
tive implications. My results suggest that the scarring eﬀect dominates the
cleansing eﬀect in the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1972 to 1993, and can
account for the observed procyclical average labor productivity.
My model stresses two frictions that stiﬂe instantaneous labor realloca-
tion. First, entry is costly, which allows diﬀerent vintages to coexist. Second,
learning takes time, so that good and bad ﬁrms both survive. Vintage and
type together can explain the observed heterogeneous ﬁrm-level productiv-
ity. The vintage component suggests that entering cohorts are more pro-
ductive than incumbents.8 The type component implies that each vintage
cohort is itself a heterogeneous group. Vintage and type together also lead
to the following productivity dynamics. Creative destruction perpetually
drives in entrants with higher productivity. Learning selects out bad ﬁrms
over time so that, as a cohort ages, its average productivity rises but produc-
tivity dispersion declines. Data from the U.S. manufacturing sector provides
large and pervasive empirical evidence to support these predictions.9
The existing empirical literature has advanced learning and creative de-
struction as powerful tools to understand the patterns of ﬁrm turnover and
industrial dynamics.10 The signiﬁcance of their interaction has also been
suggested. Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) note, “vintage eﬀects may be ob-
scured by selection eﬀects; vintage and selection eﬀects may also interact in
important ways...” In my model, the interaction of these two forces generates
8Although this is often true in the data, some authors such as Aw, Chen and Roberts
(1997) ﬁnd evidence that entrants are no more productive than incumbents. Foster, Halti-
wanger and Syverson (2003) propose an explanation by separating two measures for plant-
level productivity: a revenue-based measure and a quantity-based measure. They ﬁnd that
entrants are more productive than incumbents in terms of the quantity-based measure,
but not in the revenue-based measure because entrants charge a lower price on average.
Hence, more productive entrants can appear less proﬁtable when prices are not observed.
9For evidence on the cross-cohort and within-cohort productivity distribution, see Bald-
win (1995), Balk and Gort (1993), Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2003). For evidence
on cohort productivity dynamics, see Balk and Gort (1993) and Jensen, McGuckin and
Stiroh (2000).
10See Hall (1987), Evans (1987), Montgomery and Wascher (1988), Dunne, Roberts and
Samuelson (1989), Bresnahan and Raﬀ (1991), Bahk and Gort (1993), Caves (1998), Davis
and Haltiwanger (1999), and Jensen, McGuckin and Stiroh (2000).
4the scarring eﬀect of recessions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a model
combining creative destruction with learning. The cleansing and scarring ef-
fects are motivated in Section 3 by comparative static exercises on the steady
state equilibrium. Section 4 numerically solves the model with stochastic de-
mand ﬂuctuations and studies its quantitative implications for productivity
using data on U.S. manufacturing job ﬂows. I conclude in Section 5.
2 A Renovating Industry with Learning
This section describes a learning industry that experiences exogenous tech-
nological progress. New ﬁrms that capture the leading technology are con-
tinuously being created, and outdated ﬁrms are being destroyed. Firms enter
with diﬀerent types. As time passes by, good ﬁrms survive and bad ﬁrms
leave. Allocative ineﬃciency comes from costly entry and time-consuming
learning.
2.1 Firms
I consider an industry where labor and capital combine in ﬁxed proportions
to produce a homogenous output. There is a continuum of ﬁrms, each hiring
one worker, so that a job is created when a ﬁrm enters and a job is destroyed
when a ﬁrm exit. Each ﬁrm is characterized by two components:
1. Vintage A(t − a).
2. Type θ.
A(t) is the exogenous technological progress that grows at a constant
rate γ>0.Aﬁrm that enters the industry in period t embodies the leading
technology A(t), which becomes its vintage and will aﬀect its production
afterward. Only entrants have access to the leading technology. Incumbents
cannot retool. With a as the ﬁrm age, A(t − a) is the vintage of a ﬁrm
of age a in period t.S i n c eA(t) grows exogenously, young ﬁrms are always
technologically more advanced than old ﬁrms.
At the time of entry, a ﬁrm is endowed with a type θ. Hence, ﬁrms of
the same vintage diﬀer in type. θ can represent the talent of the manager
as in Lucas (1978), or alternatively, the location of the store, the organi-
zational structure of the production process, or its ﬁtness to the embodied
5technology.11 Ic a l lθ “the technology adoption type”.
The key assumption regarding θ is that its value, although ﬁxed at the
time of entry, is not directly observable. We can think of some real-world
cases that reﬂect this assumption. For example, when a ﬁrm adopts new
technology or introduces a new product, it needs to make many decisions,
such as picking a manager to take charge of the production or choosing a
location to sell the product. Although all ﬁrms try to make the best decisions
possible, the outcome of their choices is uncertain and will be tested via
market performance. Furthermore, their investments are irreversible; once
a manager has signed the contract and a store is built, it becomes costly to
make a new choice. Hence, the value of θ, as the consequence of a ﬁrm’s
random decisions, is unobservable and remains constant afterward.
A ﬁrm of age a and type θ produces output in period t,g i v e nb y
qt(a,θ)=A(t − a) · xt = A(t) · (1 + γ)−a · xt,( 1 )
where
xt = θ + εt.
The shock εt is an i.i.d. random draw from a ﬁxed distribution that
masks the inﬂuence of θ on output. I set the operating cost of a ﬁrm (in-
cluding wages) to 1 by normalization, and let Pt denote the output price in
period t. Then the proﬁt generated by a ﬁrm of age a and type θ in period
t is
πt (a,θ)=Pt · A(t) · (1 + γ)−a · (θ + εt) − 1.( 2 )
Both qt(a,θ) and πt (a,θ) are directly observable. Since the ﬁrm knows
its vintage, it can infer the value of xt.T h eﬁrm uses its observations of xt
to learn about θ.
2.2 “All-Or-Nothing” Learning
Firms are price takers and proﬁt maximizers. They attempt to resolve the
uncertainty about θ to decide on whether to continue or terminate the pro-
duction. The random component εt represents transitory factors that are
independent of the type θ. By assuming that εt has mean zero, we know
that
Et(xt)=Et(θ)+Et(εt)=Et(θ).
11Since a ﬁrm is identical to a job under this set-up, θ can also be interpreted as “match
quality.” See Pries (2004).
6Given knowledge of the distribution of εt, a sequence of observations of
xt allows the ﬁrm to learn about its θ. Although a continuum of potential
values for θ is more realistic, for simplicity it is assumed here that there are
only two values: θg for a good ﬁrm and θb for a bad ﬁrm. Furthermore,
εt is assumed to be distributed uniformly on [−ω,ω]. Therefore, a good
ﬁrm will have xt each period as a random draw from a uniform distribution
over [θg − ω,θg + ω],w h i l et h ext of a bad ﬁrm is drawn from an uniform
distribution over [θb − ω,θb + w].F i n a l l y ,θg, θb and ω satisfy 0 <θ b − ω<
θg − ω<θ b + ω<θ g + ω.
Pries (2004) shows that the above assumptions give rise to an “all-or-
nothing” learning process. With an observation of xt within (θb + ω,θg +
ω],t h eﬁrm learns with certainty that it is a good type; conversely, an
observation of xt within [θb − ω,θg − ω) indicates that it is a bad type.
However, an xt within [θg − ω,θb + ω] does not reveal anything, since the
probabilities of falling in this range as a good ﬁrm and as a bad ﬁrm are the
same (both equal to
2ω+θb−θg
2ω ).
This all-or-nothing learning simpliﬁes my model considerably. I let θe
represent the expected θ. Since it is θe instead of θ that aﬀects ﬁrms’
decisions, there are three types of ﬁrms corresponding to the three values of
θe: ﬁrms with θe = θg, ﬁrms with θe = θb,a n dﬁrms with θe = θu ≡ prior
mean of θ.Id e ﬁne “unsure ﬁrms” as those with θe = θu. I further assume
that the unconditional probability of θ = θg is ϕ,a n dl e tp ≡
θg−θb
2ω denote
the probability of true types being revealed every period. Firms enter the
market as unsure; thereafter, every period they stay unsure with probability
1 − p, learn they are good with probability p · ϕ a n dt h e ya r eb a dw i t h
probability p ·(1 −ϕ). Thus, the evolution of θe from the time of entry is a













If ﬁrms were to live forever, eventually all uncertainty would be resolved
because the market would provide enough information to reveal each ﬁrm’s
type. The limiting probability distribution as a goes to ∞ is
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Figure 1: Dynamics of a Birth Cohort: the distance between the concave curve and the
bottom axis measures the density of ﬁrms with θ
e = θg; the distance between the convex
c u r v ea n dt h et o pa x i sm e a s u r e st h eﬁrms with θ
e = θb; the distance between the two
curves measures the density of unsure ﬁrms (ﬁrms with θ
e = θu).
Because there is a continuum of ﬁrms, it is assumed that the law of large
numbers applies, so that both ϕ and p are not only the probabilities but
also the fractions of unsure ﬁrms with θ = θg,a n do fﬁrms who learn θ each
period, respectively. Hence, ignoring ﬁrm exit for now, I have the densities
of three groups of ﬁrms in a cohort of age a as
¡
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which implies an evolution of the cross-type ﬁrm distribution within a birth
cohort as shown in Figure 1, with the horizontal axis depicting the age of a
cohort across time. The densities of ﬁrms that are certain about their types,
whether good or bad, grow as a cohort ages. Moreover, the two “learning
curves” (depicting the evolution of densities of good ﬁrms and bad ﬁrms)
are concave. This feature is deﬁned as the decreasing property of marginal
learning in Jovanovic (1982): the marginal learning eﬀect decreases with
ﬁr ma g e ,w h i c h ,i nm ym o d e l ,i sr e ﬂected by the fact that the marginal
number of learners decreases with cohort age. The convenient feature of all-
or-nothing learning is that, on the one hand, it implies that any single ﬁrm
learns “suddenly”, which allows us to easily keep track of the cross-section
distribution of beliefs while, on the other hand, it still implies “gradual
8learning” at the cohort level.
However, there is more that Figure 1 can tell. If we let the horizontal
axis depict the cross-sectional distribution of ﬁrm ages at any instant, then
Figure 1 can be interpreted as the cross-age and cross-type ﬁrm distribution
of an industry that features constant entry but no exit. In this industry,
cohorts continuously enter in the same size and experience the same dy-
namics afterward, so that at any one time, diﬀerent life-stages of diﬀerent
birth cohorts overlap, giving rise to the distribution in Figure 1. Under this
interpretation, Figure 1 indicates that at any instant older cohorts contain
fewer unsure ﬁrms, because they have lived longer and learned more.
2.3 The Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The following sequence of events is assumed to occur within a period. First,
entry and exit occur after ﬁrms observe the aggregate state. Second, each
surviving ﬁrm pays a ﬁxed operation cost to produce. Third, the aggregate
price is realized. Fourth, ﬁrms observe revenue and update beliefs. Then,
another period begins.
With the above setup, this subsection considers a recursive competitive
equilibrium deﬁnition which includes a key component: the law of motion of
the aggregate state of the industry. The aggregate state is (F,D). F denotes
the distribution (measure) of ﬁrms across vintages and types. The part of
F that measures the number of ﬁrms with θe and a is denoted f (θe,a). D
is an exogenous demand parameter; it captures aggregate conditions and is
fully observable. The part of the law of motion for D is exogenous, described
by D’s transition matrix. The part of the law of motion for F is denoted H
so that F0 = H(F,D). The sequence of events implies that H captures the
inﬂuence of entry, exit and learning.
Three assumptions characterize the equilibrium: ﬁrm rationality, free
entry and competitive pricing.
Firm Rationality: ﬁrms are assumed to have rational expectations; their
decisions are forward-looking. In period t,aﬁrm with age a and belief θe
expects its proﬁti np e r i o ds ≥ t to equal
A(t − a) · E(Ps|Ft,D t) · θe − 1.
Et(Ps|Ft,D t) implies that ﬁrms need to observe (F,D) to predict the se-
quence of prices from today onward. Therefore, the relevant state variables
for a ﬁrm are its vintage, its belief, and the aggregate state (F,D).I l e t
V (θe,a;F,D) be the expected value, for a ﬁrm with belief θe and age a,o f
9staying in operation for one more period and optimizing afterward, when












F0 = H (F,D)
and the exogenous laws of motion for D and θe(suggested by all-or-
nothing learning).
Since ﬁrms enter as unsure, ﬁrm rationality implies that entry occurs if
and only if V (θu,0;F,D) > 0.M e a n w h i l e ,aﬁrm with belief θe and age a
exits if and only if V (θe,a;F,D) < 0.
Free entry:n e wﬁrms are free to enter at any instant, each bearing an
entry cost c. The entry cost can be interpreted as the cost of establishing a
particular location or the cost of ﬁnding a manager. Assuming f (θu,0;F,D)
represents the size of the entering cohort when the aggregate state is (F,D),
and letting c represent the entry cost, I have
c = C (f (θu,0;F,D)),c>0 and C0 ≥ 0.( 4 )
I let the entry cost depend positively on the entry size to capture the
idea that, for the industry as a whole, fast entry is costly and adjustment
may not take place instantaneously. This can arise from a limited amount of
land available to build production sites or an upward-sloping supply curve
for the industry’s capital stock.12 The free entry condition equates a ﬁrm’s
entry cost to its value of entry, and can be written as
V (θu,0;F,D)=C (f (θu,0;F,D)).( 5 )
As more new ﬁrms enter, the entry cost is driven up until it reaches the
value of entry. At this point, entry stops.






12See Subsection 3.3.1 for further discussion.
10Q represents aggregate output; it equals the the sum of production over









A · (1 + γ)−a · θe · f0 (θe,a),( 7 )
where f0 (θe,a) measure the number of in-operation ﬁrms with θe and a after
entry and exit. f0 (θe,a) belongs to F0, the updated ﬁrm distribution. Since
F0 = H(F,D), Q is a function of (F,D).
(6) implies that high output drives down the price. (7) implies that
Q depends on not only the number of ﬁrms in operation, but also their
distribution. More ﬁrms yield higher output and drive down the price; the
more the distribution is skewed toward younger vintages and better types,
the higher the output and the lower the price.
With the above three conditions, I have the following:
Deﬁnition: A recursive competitive equilibrium is a law of motion
H, a value function V , and a pricing function P such that (i) V
solves the ﬁrm’s problem; (ii) P satisﬁes (6) and (7); and (iii)
H is generated by the decision rules suggested by V and the
appropriate summing-up of entry, exit and learning.
An additional assumption is made to simplify the model:
Assumption: Given values for other parameters, the value of θb
is so low that V (θb,a;F,D) is negative for any (F,D) and a.
This assumption implies that bad ﬁrms always exit, so that at any one
time, there are only two types of ﬁrms in operation — unsure and good.
The following proposition characterizes the value function V and the
corresponding exit ages of heterogeneous ﬁrms.
Proposition 1: V (θe,a;F,D) is strictly decreasing in a,h o l d -
ing θe constant, and strictly increasing in θe, holding a constant;
therefore, there is a cut-oﬀ age a(θe;F,D) for each type, such
that ﬁrms of type θe and age a ≥ a(θe;F,D) exit before produc-
tion takes place; furthermore, a(θg;F,D) ≥ a(θu;F,D).
13Q is the sum of realized output rather than expected output, since the contribution
to aggregate output by each ﬁrm depends on its true type θ rather than θ
e.H o w e v e r ,
with a continuum of ﬁrms, the law of large numbers implies that the random noises and
the expectation errors cancel out in each cohort, so that the sum of realized output equals
the sum of expected output.
11The proof for Proposition 1 presented in the appendix is not restricted to
all-or-nothing learning. Hence, Proposition 1 holds for any learning process.
It follows from the fact that ﬁrms with smaller a and higher θe have higher
expected value of staying. As V is strictly decreasing in a, ﬁrms with belief
θe older than a(θe;F,D) exit; as the expected value of staying is strictly
increasing in θe, a good ﬁrm stays longer than an unsure ﬁrm.
3 Cleansing and Scarring
The ﬁrm distribution F enters the model as a state variable, which makes
it diﬃcult to characterize the dynamics generated by demand ﬂuctuations.
However, similar studies ﬁnd that the eﬀects of temporary changes in aggre-
gate conditions are qualitatively similar to the eﬀects of permanent changes.14
Therefore, I begin in this section with comparative static exercises on the
steady-state equilibrium. The comparative static exercises capture the essence
of industry dynamics as well as how demand can aﬀect the labor allocation,
and thus provide a more rigorous intuition for the scarring and cleansing
eﬀects described in the introduction. In the next section, I will turn to a
numerical analysis of the model’s response to stochastic demand ﬂuctuations
and conﬁrm that the results from the comparative static exercises carry over.
3.1 The Steady State
I consider a steady state a recursive competitive equilibrium with time-
invariant aggregate states.15 It satisﬁes two additional conditions, (i) D
is and is perceived as time-invariant: D0 = D. (ii) F is time-invariant:
F0 = H (F,D).S i n c eH is generated by entry, exit and learning, a steady
state must feature time-invariant entry and exit for F = H (F,D) to hold.
Thus, a steady state equilibrium can be summarized by {f(0),ag,au},w i t h
f (0) as the entry size, ag as the maximum age for good ﬁrms, and au as
the maximum age for unsure ﬁrms. The next proposition establishes the
existence of a unique steady-state equilibrium. The proof is presented in
the appendix.
Proposition 2: With D constant over time, there exists a unique
14See Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Caballero and Hammour (1994 and 1996), and
Barlevy (2003).
15I call it “steady state” following Caballero and Hammour (1994). Although it is called
“steady”, the steady-state price decreases but the steady-state average labor productivity
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Figure 2: The Steady-state Labor Distribution and Job Flows: the distance between the
lower curve (extended as the horizontal line) and the bottom axis measures the density of
good ﬁrms; the distance between the two curves measures the density of unsure ﬁrms.
time-invariant {f(0),ag,au} that satisﬁes the conditions of ﬁrm
rationality, free entry and competitive pricing.
The steady-state labor distribution and job ﬂows are illustrated in Fig-
u r e2 . L i k eF i g u r e1 ,t h e r ea r et w ow a y st oi n t e r p r e tF i g u r e2 . F i r s t ,i t
displays the steady-state life-cycle dynamics of a representative cohort with
the horizontal axis depicting the cohort age across time.F i r m se n t e ri ns i z e
f (0) as unsure. As the cohort ages and learns, bad ﬁrms are thrown out
so that the cohort size declines; good ﬁrms are realized, so that the density
of good ﬁrms increases. After age au, all unsure ﬁrms exit because their
vintage is too old to survive with θe = θu. However, ﬁrms with θe = θg
stay. Since then, the cohort contains only good ﬁrms and the number of
good ﬁrms remains constant because learning has stopped. Good ﬁrms live
until ag. The vintage after ag is too old even for good ﬁrms to survive.
Second, Figure 2 also displays the ﬁrm distribution across ages and types
at any one time, with the horizontal axis depicting the cohort age across
section. At the steady state, ﬁrms of diﬀerent ages coexist. Since older
cohorts have lived longer and learned more, cohort size declines and the
density of good ﬁrms increases with age. Cohorts older than au are of the
13same size and contain only good ﬁrms. No cohort is older than ag.
Despite its time-invariant structure, the industry experiences continuous
entry and exit. With entry, jobs are created; with exit, jobs are destroyed.
From a pure accounting point of view, there are three margins for job ﬂows:
they are the entry margin, the exit margins of good ﬁrms and unsure ﬁrms,
and the learning margin. Two forces — learning and creative destruction
— interact together to drive the job ﬂows. At the entry margin, creative
destruction drives in new vintages. At the exit margins, it drives out old
vintages. At the learning margin, bad ﬁrms are selected out. Because of
creative destruction, average labor productivity grows at the technological
pace γ. Because of learning, the productivity distribution among older co-
h o r t si sm o r es k e w e dt o w a r dg o o dﬁrms. For cohorts older than au, labor is
hired only by good ﬁrms.
3.2 Comparative Statics: Cleansing and Scarring
The previous subsection has shown that for a given demand level, there exists
a steady-state equilibrium summarized by {f(0),ag,au}. In this subsection,
I will illustrate that across steady states corresponding to diﬀerent demand
levels, the model delivers the conventional cleansing eﬀe c tp r o m o t e di nt h e
previous literature, as well as an additional scarring eﬀect. The two eﬀects
are formalized in Propositions 3 and 4.
Proposition 3: In a steady-state equilibrium, the exit age for
ﬁrms with a given belief is weakly increasing in the demand level
and the job destruction rate is weakly decreasing in the demand
level.
A detailed proof is included in the appendix. To understand Proposi-
tion 3, compare two steady states with diﬀerent demand levels, Dh >D l.
For any time t, (6) suggests that the steady state with Dl features either
a lower price, or a lower output, or both. Now assume initially that the
lower demand is fully reﬂected as a lower output and the prices of the two
steady states are identical. Then ﬁrms’ proﬁtability in the two steady states
would also be identical: Vl (θe,a)=Vh (θe,a) for any θe and a. Free entry
and the exit conditions suggest that identical value functions lead to iden-
tical entry size and exit ages, and thus an identical ﬁrm distribution. With
ﬁrm-level output of a given age and type independent of demand, identical
cross-sectional distributions imply identical aggregate output, which con-
tradicts our assumption. Therefore, we can conclude that the low-demand
14steady state must feature a lower price compared to the high-demand steady
state, so that Vl (θe,a) <V h (θe,a) for any θe and a.S i n c eV (θe,a) strictly
decreases in a,t h ec u t - o ﬀ age that solves the V (θe,a)=0must be lower
for lower demand. Intuitively, lower demand tends to drive down the price
so that some ﬁrms that are viable in a high-demand steady state are not
viable when demand is low.
Moreover, the following equation is derived by combining the exit con-














(1 − β)(1+γ − β)
βag−au
(8)
I prove in the appendix that (8) gives an unique solution for ag − au
as long as θg >θ u.S i n c e D does not enter (8), ag − au is independent of
demand:
d(ag−au)
dD =0 . (8) suggests that the demand level does not aﬀect the
gap between the exit ages of good and unsure ﬁrms. They tend to co-move
across steady states with the same magnitude.




au · ϕ +[
1−ϕ
p +( ag − au) · ϕ] · [1 − (1 − p)au+1]
. (9)












d(D) ≥ 0,i m p l i e s
d(jdss)
d(D) ≤ 0. Put intuitively, a high-
demand steady state allows both unsure ﬁrms and good ﬁrms to live longer,
so that less jobs are destroyed at the exit margins.
To summarize, Proposition 3 argues that the steady state with lower
demand features younger exit ages and a higher job destruction rate. In
other words, it suggests that more ﬁrms are cleared out in an environment
that is more diﬃcult for survival.
16According to Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), the job destruction rate at time t is
deﬁned as:
2 ∗ Jobs destroyed in period t
[(number of jobs at the beginning of period t)+( number of jobs at the beginning of period t +1 ) ]
. With constant total number of jobs, the steady-state job destruction rate equals the
ratio of jobs destroyed at the learning and exit margins over the total number of jobs. The
expression of jd
ss applies not only to a steady state, but also to any industry equilibrium
that features time-invariant entry and exit. See Subsection 4.2 for further discussions on
jd
ss.
15If the above story suggested by comparative statics carries over when D
ﬂuctuates stochastically over time, then my model delivers a conventional
“cleansing” eﬀect, in which average ﬁrm age falls during recessions so that
recessions direct resources to younger, more productive vintages. However,
once learning is allowed, we also need to take into account the allocation
of labor across types. With only two true types, good and bad, the type
distribution of labor can be summarized by the fraction of labor at good
ﬁrms. A higher fraction suggests a more eﬃcient cross-type allocation of
labor. The next proposition establishes how demand aﬀects this ratio.
Proposition 4: In a steady state equilibrium, the fraction of labor
at good ﬁrms is weakly increasing in the demand level.
It can be shown that the steady-state fraction of labor at good ﬁrms,
denoted lss





1−(1−p)au +( 1− ϕ)+pϕ(ag − au)
.
Again, since (ag −au) is independent of D,d e m a n da ﬀects lss
g only through








d(D) .Ip r o v e
d(lss
g )
d(au) ≥ 0 in the appendix,
which, together with
d(au)




My analysis suggests that the impact of demand on the fraction of labor
at good ﬁrms comes from its impact on the exit age of unsure ﬁrms. To
understand this result intuitively, consider Figure 3.
Figure 3 displays the steady-state industry structures corresponding to
two demand levels.17 The cleansing eﬀect formalized in Proposition 3 is
shown as the leftward shift of the two exit margins. The shifted margins
clear out old ﬁrms that could be either good or unsure. However, the leftward
shift of the unsure exit margin also reduces the amount of older good ﬁrms.
The latter, shown as the shaded area in Figure 3, is the scarring eﬀect of
recessions.
The scarring eﬀect stems from learning. New entrants begin unsure of
their type, although a proportion ϕ are truly good. Over time, more and
more bad ﬁrms leave while good ﬁrms stay. Since learning takes time, the
number of “potentially good ﬁrms” that realize their true types depends on
17The entry sizes of the two steady states, although diﬀerent, are normalized as 1. Since
the steady state features time-invariant entry and all cohorts are the same size, entry size









Figure 3: Cleansing and Scarring
how many learning chances they have. If ﬁrms could live forever, eventually
all the potentially good ﬁrms would get to realize their true types. But
a ﬁnite life span of unsure ﬁrms implies that if potentially good ﬁrms do
not learn before age au, they exit and thus forever lose the chance to learn.
Therefore, au represents not only the exit age of unsure ﬁrms, but also the
number of learning opportunities. A low au allows potentially good ﬁrms
fewer chances to realize their true types, so that the number of old good
ﬁrms in operation after age au are also reduced.
Hence, the industry suﬀers from uncertainty; it tries to select out bad
ﬁrms but the group of ﬁrms it clears at age au includes some ﬁrms that
are truly good. The number of clearing mistakes the industry makes at au
depends on the size of the unsure exit margin, which in turn depends on the
value of au.18 When a drop in demand reduces the value of au, this reduces
the number of learning opportunities, allows fewer good ﬁrms to become old
and thus shifts the labor distribution toward bad ﬁrms.
To summarize from Proposition 3 and Proposition 4, a low-demand
steady state features a better average vintage, yet a less eﬃcient cross-
type distribution of labor. If the comparative static results carry over when
18The all-or-nothing learning suggests that the number of truly good ﬁrms cleared out
at au equals f (0)(1 − p)
au ϕ.
17demand ﬂuctuates stochastically, then recessions will have both a conven-
tional cleansing eﬀect, shifting resources to better vintages, and a scarring
eﬀect, shifting resources to bad types. The two eﬀects are directly related
to each other: it is the cleansing eﬀe c tt h a ts i g n i ﬁcantly reduces learning
opportunities and hence prevents more ﬁrms from realizing their potential.
When we move beyond steady states to allow for cyclical ﬂuctuations, the
intuition behind “cleansing and scarring” still carries over. Consider Figure
3. Both exit margins shift as soon as demand drops so that the cleansing
eﬀect takes place immediately.19 However, the scarring eﬀect takes place
gradually. When a recession ﬁrst arrives, the group of ﬁrms already in the
shaded area in Figure 3 will not leave despite the shift in exit margins, since
they know their true types to be good. They leave gradually as the recession
persists. At this point, the scarring eﬀect starts to take place: the reduced
au allows fewer good ﬁrms to survive past au. The shaded area would
eventually be left blank, and the “scar” left by recessions would surface.
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Two modiﬁcations are examined in this subsection to check the robustness
of my results from the comparative static exercises: ﬁrst, I allow the entry
cost to be independent of entry size; second, I allow the process of learning
to be more complicated than “all-or-nothing”.
3.3.1 Entry Cost Independent of Entry Size
The previous subsection has argued that the shift of the exit margins creates
both a cleansing eﬀect and a scarring eﬀect. Now, focus on the entry side.
How does demand aﬀect entry, and how would this aﬀect my results?
To address these questions, recall that the free entry condition requires
V (θu,0) = C (f (θu,0)),a n dC is assumed to depend positively on entry size.
Since low demand reduces the value of entry by driving down proﬁtability,
C0 (f (θu,0)) > 0 implies less entry (smaller f (θu,0)) for the low-demand
steady state. Hence, an industry in my model has two margins along which
it can accommodate low demand. It can either reduce entry, or increase exit
by shifting the exit margins. The issue is which of these two margins will
respond when demand falls, and by how much. If the drop in demand level
19My numerical exercises with demand ﬂuctuations imply that when demand falls, these
margins initially shift more than suggested by the comparative static exercises. The mar-
gins shift back partially as the recession persists. A detailed discussion of this phenomenon
is discussed in Section 4.
18can be fully incorporated as a decrease in entry size, the exit margins might
not respond.
The extreme case that the entry margin exclusively accommodates de-
mand ﬂuctuations is deﬁned as the “full-insulation” case in Caballero and
Hammour (1994). They argue that creation (entry) “insulates” destruc-
tion (exit), and the extent of the insulation eﬀect depends on the cost
of fast entry, that is, C0 (f (θu,0)). The full-insulation case occurs when
C0 (f (θu,0)) = 0. The intuition is as follows. If entry cost is independent of
entry size, then fast entry is costless and the adjustment on the entry mar-
gin becomes instantaneous. When demand falls, entry will adjust to such a
level that aggregate output falls by the same proportion, which keeps price
at the same level. Then the value of staying remain unaﬀected, and the exit
margins do not respond. Hence, with entry cost independent of entry size,
there is neither a cleansing eﬀect nor a scarring eﬀect.
Two remarks can be made. First, in reality, an industry may not be
able to create all the necessary production units instantaneously. Goolsbee
(1998) shows empirically that higher investment demand drives up both
the equipment prices and the wage of workers producing the capital goods.
His ﬁndings suggest that as more ﬁr m sc o m i n gi nw i t hr i s i n gd e m a n df o r
capital, it becomes increasingly costly to adjust the capital stock. As another
intuitive example, when more new stores are built, land prices and rentals
usually rise. Therefore, C0 (f (θu,0)) > 0 seems more reasonable. Second,
data does not support the assumption that C0 (f (θu,0)) = 0.I n t h e f u l l -
insulation case, job creation fully accommodates demand ﬂuctuations and
job destruction does not respond. This contradicts the large and robust
evidence that job destruction is more responsive than job creation to the
business cycle.20
3.3.2 More Complicated Learning
As I have argued in subsection 2.2, the all-or-nothing learning with a uni-
form distribution of random noise simpliﬁes the analysis considerably. But
how restrictive is it? Would the scarring eﬀect carry over with a more com-
plicated process of learning?
In general, we can deﬁne the scarring eﬀect as a drop in the fraction of
labor at good ﬁrms. To look at the scarring eﬀect from a diﬀerent angle, I
divide ﬁrms into two groups, young and old.21 With lo
g denoting the fraction
20See footnote 6.
21The cut-oﬀ age to deﬁne “young” and “old” is arbitrarily chosen. Changing this
cut-oﬀ age does not aﬀect the analysis that follows.
19of labor at good ﬁrms among the old, l
y
g as the fraction among the young, fy
as the density of young ﬁrms and fo as the density of old ﬁrms, the fraction


































which is greater than or equal to zero as long as lo
g − l
y
g ≥ 0,w h i c hs h o u l d
hold for any learning process, since old ﬁrms have experienced more learn-
ing. Hence, the scarring eﬀect of recessions should occur under any type of
learning as long as recessions reduce the ratio of old to young ﬁrms (
fo
fy),
w h i c hb yd e ﬁnition will be true in any model in which recessions cleanse
the economy of older vintages. Intuitively, the scarring eﬀect suggests that
recessions shift resources toward younger ﬁrms, so that there cannot be as
much learning taking place as in booms.
N o ws u p p o s ew ea s s u m eam o r ec o m p l i c ated learning process with nor-
mally distributed random noise, so that the signals received by good ﬁrms
are normally distributed around θg and the signals received by bad ﬁrms are
normally distributed around θb. In that case, a ﬁrm can never know for cer-
tain that it is good or bad, and posterior beliefs are distributed continuously
between θb and θg. The expected value of staying would still depend posi-
tively on θe and negatively on age. Thus, given the aggregate state, there
would be a cut-oﬀ age for each belief, a(θe;F,D), such that ﬁrms with belief
θe do not live beyond a(θe;F,D).
With a recession, the value of staying across all ages and types falls, so
that for each belief θe, the cut-oﬀ age a(θe;F,D) becomes younger. Hence,









af a l li n
fo
fy drives down the ratio of good ﬁrms and creates the scarring eﬀect.
Although this analysis is preliminary,22 we can still argue that recessions
would allow for less ﬁrm learning, so the scarring eﬀect would carry over
even with a more complicated process of learning.
22For instance, the analysis cannot address the relative sizes of the cleansing eﬀect on
young ﬁr m sv e r s u so l dﬁrms. Whether cleansing aﬀects primarily young or old ﬁrms
depends on the speciﬁcs of the learning process.
204 Quantitative Implications with Stochastic De-
mand Fluctuations
I establishe in Section 3 that across steady states, my model delivers two
competing eﬀects — cleansing and scarring. Now the questions are, whether
the two eﬀects carry over when demand ﬂuctuates stochastically, and which
one dominates quantitatively.
This section turns to numerical techniques to analyze a stochastic version
of my model in which the demand level follows a two-state Markov process
with values [Dh,D l] and transition probability µ. Throughout this section,
ﬁrms expect the current demand level to persist for the next period with
probability µ, and to change with probability 1 − µ.
I ﬁrst describe my computational strategy, which follows Krusell and
Smith (1998) by shrinking the state space into a limited set of variables and
showing that these variables’ laws of motion can approximate the equilib-
rium behavior of ﬁrms in the simulated time series. Later in this section, I
conﬁrm that the basic insights from the comparative static exercises carry
over with probabilistic business cycles. Then I examine whether the scar-
ring eﬀect is likely to be empirically relevant. Speciﬁcally, I calibrate my
model so that its equilibrium job destruction rate mimics the observed pat-
tern in the U.S. manufacturing industry. As I have argued, recessions clear
out old ﬁrms, including some good ﬁrms that have not yet learned their
type. Therefore, the model allows us to use the job destruction rate to make
inferences on the size of the cleansing and scarring eﬀects.
4.1 Computational Strategy
The deﬁnition of the recursive competitive equilibrium in Section 2 implies
that individual decision rules can be generated from the value functions
V ; by summing up the corresponding individual decision rules, we can get
the laws of motion H, then trace out the evolution of industry structure.
Therefore, the key computational task is to map F,t h eﬁrm distribution
across ages and types, given demand level D, into a set of value functions
V (θe,a;F,D). Unfortunately, the endogenous state variable F is a high-
dimensional object. The numerical solution of dynamic programming prob-
lems becomes increasingly diﬃcult as the size of the state space increases.






(1 + γ)−a · θe · f (θe,a). (10)
Combining (9) with (6) and (7), I get




A is the leading technology; F0 is the updated ﬁrm distribution after the
entry and exit; X0 corresponds to F0; P (F,D) is the equilibrium price in a
period with initial aggregate state (F,D).S i n c e F0 = H(F,D),t h ea b o v e
equation can be re-written as
P (F,D) · A =
D
X (H (F,D))
Given these deﬁnitions, the single-period proﬁtability of a ﬁrm of type θe




· (1 + γ)−a · (θ + ε) − 1. (11)
Thus, the aggregate state (F,D) and its law of motion help ﬁrms to pre-
dict future proﬁtability by suggesting sequences of X’s from today onward
under diﬀerent paths of demand realizations. The question then is: what is
the ﬁrm’s critical level of knowledge of F that allows it to predict the se-
quence of X0s over time? Although ﬁrms would ideally have full information
about F, this is not computationally feasible. Therefore I need to ﬁnd an
information set Ω that delivers a good approximation of ﬁrms’ equilibrium
behavior, yet is small enough to reduce the computational diﬃculty.
Il o o kf o raΩ through the following procedure. In step 1, I choose a
candidate Ω. In step 2, I choose the laws of motion for all members of Ω,
denoted HΩ, such that Ω0 = HΩ (Ω,D). I ns t e p3 ,g i v e nHΩ,Ic a l c u l a t e
ﬁrms’ value functions on a grid of points in the state space of Ω applying
value function iteration approach, and obtain the corresponding industry-
level decision rules — entry sizes and exit ages across aggregate states. In
step 4, given such decision rules and an initial ﬁrm distribution,24 Is i m u -
late the behavior of a continuum of ﬁrms along a random path of demand
23X can be interpreted as detrended output.
24I start with a uniform ﬁrm distribution across types and ages. My numerical exercises
suggest that the dynamic system of my model is stable and that the initial ﬁrm distribution
does not aﬀect the result.
22Ω {X}
HΩ
Hx(X,Dh):logX0 =1 .2631 + 0.8536logX
Hx (X,Dl):logX0 =2 .4261 + 0.7172logX








Den Haan & Marcet test statistic (χ2
7) 0.8007
Table 1: The Estimated Laws of Motion and Measures of Fit
realizations, and derive the implied aggregate behavior – a time series of
Ω. In step 5, I use the stationary region of the simulated series to estimate
the implied laws of motion and compare them with the perceived HΩ;i f
diﬀerent, I update HΩ, return to step 3 and continue until convergence. In
step 6, once HΩ converges, I evaluate the ﬁto fHΩ in terms of tracking the
aggregate behavior. If the ﬁt is satisfactory, I stop; if not, I return to step 1,
make ﬁrms more knowledgeable by expanding Ω, and repeat the procedure.
I start with Ω = {X} – ﬁrms observe X instead of F.I f u r t h e r a s -
sume that ﬁrms perceive the sequence of future coming X0s as depending
on nothing more than the current observed X. The perceived law of motion
for X is denoted Hx so that X0 = Hx (X,D). I then apply the procedure
described above and simulate the behavior of a continuum of ﬁrms over 5000
periods. The results are presented in Table 1. As shown in Table 1, the es-
timated Hx is log-linear. And the ﬁto fHx is quite good, as suggested by
the high R2, the low standard forecast error, and the low maximum fore-
cast error. The good ﬁtw h e nΩ = {X} implies that ﬁrms perceiving these
simple laws of motion make only small mistakes in forecasting future prices.
To explore the extent to which the forecast error can be explained by vari-
ables other than X, I implement Den Haan and Marcet (1994) test using
instruments [1,X,µ a,σa,γa,κ a,r u],w h e r eµa, σa, γa, κa,ru are the mean,
standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of the age distribution of ﬁrms,
and the fraction of unsure ﬁrms, respectively.25 The test statistic is 0.8007,
25Den Haan and Marcet (1994) oﬀer a statistic for computing the accuracy of a simula-
tion. It has an asymptotic χ
2 distribution under the null that the simulation is accurate.
















0, ut+1 is the expectation error for Xt+1(or logXt+1), and
23Figure 4: Expected Value of Staying: aggregate state variables are D and logX (the log
of detrended output), ﬁrm-level state variables are ﬁrm age and belief (good or unsure);



























of good firms in booms 
of good firms in recessions 
of unsure firms in booms 
of unsure firms in recessions 
in booms 
in recessions 
Figure 5: Industry-level Policy Functions: Entry Size and Exit Ages. Aggregate states
are D (booms or recessions) and logX (the log of detrended output).
well below the critical value at the 1% level. This suggests that given the
estimated laws of motion, I do not ﬁnd much additional forecasting power
contained in other variables. Nevertheless, I expand Ω further to include σa,
the standard deviation of the age distribution of ﬁrms. The results when
Ω = {X,σa} are presented in the appendix. The measures of ﬁtd on o t
change much.26 Furthermore, the impact of changes in σa on the approx-
imated value function is very small (less than 0.5%). This conﬁrms that
the inclusion of information other than X improves the forecast accuracy by
only a very small amount.
Figure 4 displays the value of staying for heterogeneous ﬁr m sa saf u n c -
tion of a, θe, D and X (logX). Figure 5 displays the corresponding optimal
exit ages and entry sizes. The properties of value functions and exit ages
stated in Proposition 2 are satisﬁed in both ﬁgures: given the aggregate
h(Gt) is some function of variables dated t.I c h o o s e h(Gt)=[ 1 ,X,µ a,σ a,γa,κ a,r u],
which gives my test statistic 7 degrees of freedom.
26Actually the ﬁt during recessions becomes worse to some extent. Young (2002) adds
an additional moment to the original Krusell & Smith approach, and also gets worse
measure of ﬁt for the bad state (recessions). He attributes this result to numerical error.
25parameters (pre-chosen) value
productivity of bad ﬁrms: θb 1
productivity of good ﬁrms: θg 3.5
quarterly technological pace: γ 0.007
quarterly discount factor: β 0.99
parameters (calibrated) value
high demand: Dh 2899
low demand: Dl 2464
prior probability of being a good ﬁrm: ϕ 0.14
quarterly pace of learning: p 0.08
persistence rate of demand: µ 0.58
entry cost function 0.405 + 0.52 ∗ f(0,θu)
Table 2: Base-line Parameterization of the Model
state, the value of staying is increasing in the expected type θe and decreas-
ing in ﬁrm age; and good ﬁrms exit at an older age than unsure ﬁrms.
To conclude, Table 1, Figures 4 and 5 suggest that my solution using X
to approximate the aggregate state closely replicates optimal ﬁrm behavior
at the equilibrium.27 Therefore, I use the solution based on Ω = {X} to
generate all the series in the subsequent analysis.
4.2 Calibration
Table 2 presents the assigned parameter values. Some of the parameter
values are pre-chosen. The most signiﬁcant in this group are the relative
productivity of good and bad ﬁrms. I follow Davis and Haltiwanger (1999),
who assume a ratio of high-to-low productivity of 2.4 for total factor produc-
tivity and 3.5 for labor productivity based on the between-plant productivity
diﬀerentials reported by Bartelsman and Doms (1997). Since labor is the
only input in my model, I normalize productivity of bad ﬁrms as 1 and set
productivity of good ﬁrms as 3.5. I allow a period to represent one quarter
and set the quarterly discount factor β =0 .99.N e x t ,In e e dt oc h o o s eγ,t h e
quarterly pace of technological progress. In a model with only creative de-
struction, Caballero and Hammour (1994) choose the quarterly technological
27Those results were robust when I experimented with diﬀerent parameterizations of
the model. Although it suggests that the simulation is good, one could say that these are
self-fulﬁlling equilibria: because everyone perceives a simple law of motion, they behave
correspondingly so that the aggregate states turn out as predicted. However, it has been
diﬃcult to prove theoretically the existence of such self-fulﬁlling equilibria in my model.
26growth rate as 0.007 by attributing all output growth of US manufacturing
from 1972:2 to 1983:4 to technical progress. To make a convenient compar-
ison with their result in the coming subsections, I also choose γ =0 .007.
Caballero and Hammour (1994) assume a linear entry cost function c0 + c1
f(0,θu) with f(0,θu) denoting the size of entry, which is also applied in my
calibration exercises.
The remaining undetermined parameters are: p, the pace of learning;
ϕ, the probability of being a good ﬁrm; Dh and Dl, the demand levels;
µ, the probability with which demand persists; and c0 and c1,t h ee n t r y
cost parameters. The values of these parameters are chosen so that the job
destruction series in the calibrated model matches properties of the historical
series from the U.S. manufacturing sector. Their values are calibrated in the
following manner.
First, I match the long-run behavior of job destruction. My numerical
simulations suggest that the dynamic system eventually settles down with
constant entry and exit along any path where demand level is unchanging.
The industry structures at the stable points are similar to those at the steady
states, which allows me to use steady state conditions for approximation.28 I
let ag and au represent the maximum ages of good ﬁrms and unsure ﬁrms at
the high-demand steady state and ag
0 and au
0 represent the exit ages at the
low-demand steady state. The steady-state job destruction rate, denoted
jdss, is given by (9).
Secondly, I match the peak in job destruction that occurs at the onset of
a recession. My model suggests that the jump in the job destruction rate at
the beginning of a recession comes from the shift of exit margins to younger
ages. I assume that when demand drops, the exit margins shift from ag and
au to ag
0 and au
0 at once, so that the job destruction rate at the beginning
28However, a stable point is diﬀerent from a steady state. In a steady state, ﬁrms
perceive demand as constant, while in a stable point, ﬁrms perceive demand to persist
with probability µ, and to change with probability 1 − µ.
27Descriptive Statistics Mean Min. Max. Std.
Value 5.6% 2.96% 11.60% 1.66%
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Quarterly Job Destruction in U.S. Manufacturing
(1972:2-1993:4), constructed by Davis and Haltiwanger.
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Thirdly, I match the trough in job destruction that occurs at the onset
of a boom. My model suggests that when demand goes up, the exit margins
extend to older ages so that for several subsequent periods job destruction
comes only from the learning margin, implying a trough in the job destruc-














0) · ϕ] · [1 − (1 − p)au
0+1]
(13)
Now I turn to data for conditions on jdss, jdmax,a n djdmin.T a b l e3l i s t s
descriptive statistics for the job destruction series of the U.S. manufacturing
sector from 1972:2 to 1993:4 compliled by Davis and Haltiwanger. This data
places three restrictions on the values of p, ϕ, ag, au, ag
0 and au
0.F i r s t ,
the implied jdss with either (ag,au) or (ag
0,au
0) must be around 5.6%.30
Second, the implied jdmax must not exceed 11.6%. Third, the implied jdmin
must be above 3%. Additionally, (ag,au) and (ag
0,au
0) must satisfy (8),
the gap between the exit ages of good and unsure ﬁrms suggested by the
steady state. There are six equations in total to pin down the values of
29As I have noted earlier, the calibration exercises suggest that when a negative aggre-
gate demand shock strikes, the exit margins shift more than ag
0 and au
0. The bigger shift
implies a bigger jump in job destruction, This is why I require negmax to lie below 11.60%.
I experiment with diﬀerent demand levels to ﬁnd those that generate the closest ﬁt.
30The one implied by (ag
0,au
0) is slightly higher since I assume ag
0 < ag and au
0 < au.
28these six parameters. Using a search algorithm, I ﬁnd that these conditions
are satisﬁed for the following combination of parameter values: p =0 .06,
ϕ =0 .18, ag =7 8 , au =6 2 , ag
0 =7 3 , au
0 =5 7 . By applying these ag, au,
ag
0 and au
0 to the steady state industry structure, I ﬁnd Dh = 2899 and
Dl =2 4 6 4 .
The value of µ is calibrated to match the observed standard deviation
1.66. I nm ym o d e l ,t h ej o bd e s t r u c t i o nr a t ej u m p sa b o v ei t sm e a nw h e n
demand drops and falls below when demand rises. Thus, the frequency of
demand switches between Dh and Dl determines the frequency with which
the job destruction rate ﬂuctuates between 11.6% and 3%,w h i c hi nt u r n
aﬀects the standard deviation of the simulated job destruction series. My
calibration exercises suggest µ =0 .58. Finally, the entry cost parameters
are adjusted to match the observed mean job creation rate 5.19%.
4.3 Response to a Negative Demand Shock and Simulations
of U.S. Manufacturing Job Flows
With all of the parameter values assigned, I approximate ﬁrms’ value func-
tions applying the computational strategy described in subsection 4.1. With
the approximated value functions, the corresponding decision rules and an
initial ﬁrm distribution, I can investigate the dynamics of my model’s key
variables along any particular path of demand realizations, and study the
model’s quantitative implications.
4.3.1 Scarring and Cleansing over the Cycle
To assess the eﬀect of a negative demand shock, I start with a random ﬁrm
distribution and simulate my model with demand level equal to Dh for the
ﬁrst 200 quarters. Regardless of the initial ﬁrm distributions, I ﬁnd that the
exit age of good ﬁrms settles down to 76, the exit age of unsure ﬁrms settles
down to 62, the job destruction rate converges to 5.38%, and the fraction
of good ﬁrms converges to 49.8%. This suggests that my model is globally
stable. Once the key variables converge, I simulate the eﬀects of a negative
demand shock that persists for the next 87 quarters.
The dynamics of the job destruction rate and the job creation rate are
illustrated in Panel 1 of Figure 6, with the quarter labeled 0 denoting the
onset of a recession. The job destruction rate goes up from 5.38% to 10.84%
on impact. Thus, the immediate eﬀect of a negative demand shock is to
clear out some ﬁrms that would have stayed in if demand had remained high.
After 70 quarters, the job destruction rate converges to 5.63%, still above its
29original value. Hence, the conventional cleansing eﬀect on job destruction
from the comparative static exercises carries over with probabilistic cycles.
Unlike the job destruction rate, the job creation rate drops from 4.69%
to 4.32% when a recession strikes, rises gradually and converges later. This
matches the ﬁnding of Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) that the job creation
rate falls during recessions and co-moves negatively with the job destruction
rate over the cycle.31
The analysis of the steady state also suggests that recessions will bring
a scarring eﬀect by shifting labor resources toward bad ﬁrms. As shown in
Panel 2 of Figure 6, the fraction of labor at good ﬁrms drops from 49.8%
to 48.07% when the negative demand shock strikes and converges to 47.87%
after 70 quarters. This implies that the negative demand shock shifts the
cross-type ﬁrm distribution toward bad ﬁrms. Hence, the scarring eﬀect
suggested by the steady-state analysis also carries over with probabilistic
business cycles.
Two remarks are in order regarding the response of the fraction of labor
at good ﬁrms to a negative demand shock. First, the initial drop in lg at
the onset of a recession contradicts my argument in Section 2.2 that the
scarring eﬀect takes time to work. My calibration exercises suggest that
this feature is robust and can be understood as follows. Recessions shift
both exit margins to younger ages. While the shift of the exit margin for
unsure ﬁrms clears out both bad ﬁrms and good ﬁrms, the shift of the exit
margin for good ﬁr m sc l e a r so u tonly good ﬁrms, so that in total more good
ﬁrms are cleared out than bad ﬁrms initially and lg drops at the onset of a
recession. Since lg eventually converges to a value below the initial drop, and
the initial drop in lg also stems from learning, this result does not hurt my
argument that in a model with learning, recessions create a scarring eﬀect
by shifting resources toward bad ﬁrms.
Second, the response of lg shown in Panel 2 is hump-shaped: it drops
initially, increases gradually, then declines again. This feature is mainly due
to the response of the exit margins over the cycle. When a recession ﬁrst
strikes, the exit margins over-shift to the left, and shift back gradually as the
recession persists. As the exit margin for unsure ﬁr m ss h i f t sb a c k ,m o r eg o o d
ﬁrms are allowed to reach their potential; meanwhile, as the exit margin for
good ﬁr m ss h i f t sb a c k ,n oo l dg o o dﬁrms exit for several quarters. Hence, lg
increases after the initial drop. The exit margins reach their stable points
after about 20 quarters. From then on, lg starts to fall, with old good ﬁrms
31Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) report a correlation coeﬃcient of −0.17 of job destruc-
tion and job creation for the U.S. Manufacturing from 1947:1-1993:4.
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Figure 6: Response to a Negative Demand Shock: vin is the detrended average labor
productivity driven only by the cleansing eﬀect, prod is the detrended average labor pro-
ductivity driven by both the cleansing eﬀect and the scarring eﬀect. Scar = prod − vin.
The horizontal axis denotes quarters, with the quarter labeled 0 denoting the onset of a
recession.
31gradually being cleared out but not enough new good ﬁrms being realized.
Another part of this hump-shaped response comes from the entry margin.
Because they have had no time to learn, newly entered cohorts have the least
eﬃcient cross-type ﬁrm distribution in the industry, so that entry tends to
drive down lg. When entry falls in a recession, the negative impact of entry
on lg is also reduced, which contributes to part of the increase in lg after the
initial drop.
To summarize, despite some transitory dynamics, Panel 1 and Panel 2
of Figure 6 suggest that both the conventional cleansing eﬀect established
in Proposition 2, and the scarring eﬀect established in Proposition 3, carry
over with probabilistic business cycles.
4.3.2 Implications for Productivity
Next, I turn to the quantitative implications of the model for the cyclical
behavior of average labor productivity. With one worker per ﬁrm setup and
ﬁrm-level productivity given by A·θ
(1+γ)a, average labor productivity is aﬀected
by A, the level of the leading technology, and the ﬁrm distribution across
a and θ. While technological progress drives A, and thus average labor
productivity, to grow at a trend rate γ (the technological pace), demand
shocks add ﬂuctuations around this trend by aﬀecting the labor distribution
across a and θ.
To analyze the ﬂuctuations of average labor productivity over the cycle,
Id e ﬁne de-trended average labor productivity as the average of θ
(1+γ)a over
heterogeneous ﬁrms. In evaluating this measure, recall that there are two
competing eﬀects. On the one hand, the cleansing eﬀect drives down the
average a by lowering the cut-oﬀ ages for each type, causing average labor
productivity to rise. On the other hand, the scarring eﬀect drives down the
average θ by shifting resources away from good ﬁrms, causing average labor
productivity to fall. To separate the two eﬀects, I generate two indexes for
average labor productivity. The ﬁrst index is the average of θ
(1+γ)a across













This measure is aﬀected by both cleansing and scarring eﬀects. The other
32index is the average of 1













This measure is aﬀected only by the cleansing eﬀect. To compare the relative
magnitude of these two eﬀects, their initial levels are both normalized as 1.
Since only the cleansing eﬀect drives the dynamics of vin but both cleansing
and scarring eﬀects drive the dynamics of prod, the gap between vin and
prod reﬂects the magnitude of the scarring eﬀect. A scarring index measures
this gap. It is deﬁned as:
scar = prod − vin.
Panel 3 in Figure 6 traces the evolution of vin and prod in response
to a negative demand shock. As the negative demand shock strikes, the
cleansing eﬀect alone raises the average labor productivity to 1.013 while
the scarring eﬀect brings the average labor productivity down to 0.9974.
After 70 quarters, prod converges to 0.9947 while vin converges to 1.0126.
The dynamics of the scarring index in response to a negative demand shock
is plotted in Panel 4 of Figure 6. The scarring index remains negative fol-
lowing a negative demand shock and eventually converges to −0.0179.T h i s
matches the predictions of my model that the scarring eﬀect plays against
the conventional cleansing eﬀect during recessions by shifting resources away
from good ﬁrms, driving down the average labor productivity.
4.3.3 Simulation of U.S. Manufacturing Job Flows
To gauge whether the scarring eﬀect is likely to be relevant at business cycle
frequencies, I simulate my model’s response to random demand realizations
generated by the model’s Markov chain. I perform 1000 simulations of 87
quarters each. Results are presented in Table 4. The reported statistics are
means (standard deviations) based on 1000 simulated samples. Sample sta-
tistics for U.S. Manufacturing data for the 87 quarters from 1972:2 to1993:4
are included for comparison. In the table, jd and jc represent the job de-
struction and job creation rate; prod and q represent de-trended average
labor productivity and de-trended output.
Table 4 suggests that my calibrated model can replicate the observed







Table 4: Means (std errors) of 1000 Simulated 87-quarter Samples: jd is the job destruc-
tion rate, jc is the job creation rate, prod is detrended average labor productivity, q is
detrended aggregate output. Data comes from the U.S. Manufacturing job ﬂow series for
1972:2-1993:4, compiled by Davis and Haltiwanger. *Detrended average labor productiv-
ity is calculated as output per production worker, with output measured by industrial
production index. The quarterly series of industrial production index of U.S. manufac-
turing sector for 1972:2-1993:4 comes from the Federal Reserve and the series of total
production workers comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
between prod and q implies that my model generates procyclical average
labor productivity for the U.S. manufacturing sector in the relevant period.
Put diﬀerently, under my benchmark calibration the scarring eﬀect on cycli-
cal productivity dominates the cleansing eﬀect.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis of the Dominance of Scarring over
Cleansing
In the baseline parameterization of subsection 4.2, I followed Caballero and
Hammour (1994) in setting the quarterly technological pace γ equal to 0.007.
The value was estimated by attributing all output growth of the U.S. man-
ufacturing sector to technological progress, which may exaggerate the tech-
nological pace in the relevant period. An alternative estimate of γ,h a sb e e n
provided by Basu, Fernald and Shapiro (2001), who estimate TFP growth
for diﬀerent industries in the U.S. from 1965 to 1996 after controlling for
employment growth, factor utilization, capital adjustment costs, quality of
inputs and deviations from constant returns and perfect competition. Table
5 presents their results for the period 1979-1990: a quarterly technological
pace of 0.0037 for durable manufacturing, a pace of 0.0027 for non-durable
manufacturing and an even slower pace for other sectors.
How would a slow pace of technological progress aﬀect the magnitudes
of the scarring and cleansing eﬀects? To address this question, I re-calibrate
my model assuming γ =0 .003, matching the same moments of job creation
and destruction as before, and simulate responses to a negative demand






Table 5: Estimated Growth in TFP (Basu, Fernald and Shapiro 2001)
Calibration Results γ =0 .003 γ =0 .007
calibrated p 0.0830 0.0800
calibrated ϕ 0.1200 0.1420
Response to a Negative
Demand Shock
vin (when a recession strikes) 1.0052 1.0130
vin (70 quarters after a reces-
sion strikes)
1.0029 1.0126
prod (when a recession strikes) 0.9866 0.9974
prod (70 quarters after a reces-
sion strikes)
0.9820 0.9947
scar (when a recession strikes) −0.0186 −0.0156
scar (70 quarters after a reces-
sion strikes)
−0.0209 −0.0179
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis to a Slower Technological Pace (I): prod is detrended aver-
age labor productivity, driven by both the cleansing and the scarring eﬀects, vin is the
component of detrended average labor productivity driven only by the cleansing eﬀect,
scar = prod - vin. Other parameter values are as shown in Table 2.
baseline parameterization.
The calibration results in Table 6 suggest that the model with γ =0 .003
needs a faster learning pace (p =0 .083 compared to 0.08)a n das m a l l e r
prior probability of ﬁrms’ being good (ϕ =0 .120 compared to 0.142)t o
match the observed moments of job ﬂows.32 The simulated responses suggest
32Consider (9), the expression of jd
ss, for intuition. My calibration exercises look for
parameter values that satisfy three moment conditions on job ﬂows, one of which is that
jd
ss ≈ 5.6%. Proposition 3 establishes that jd
ss decreases with the exit ages (ag and au).
It can be further shown that it increases in p but decreases in ϕ. A slower technological
pace weakens the technical disadvantage of old ﬁrms and extends their life span so that
both ag and au tend to increase. Hence, the job destruction rate would decrease if p and
ϕ remain the same. A faster learning pace and a lower prior probability of being good are
thus needed to match the observed mean job destruction. Thus, the paramerization of
35simulation statistics
with γ =0 .003
simulation statistics
with γ =0 .007
data
jdmean 5.73%(0.0799%) 5.29%(0.0100%) 5.6%
jdstd 1.42%(0.2800%) 1.65%(0.3100%) 1.66%
jcmean 5.14%(0.0565%) 4.72%(0.0581%) 5.19%
jcstd 0.34%(0.0059%) 0.37%(0.0535%) 0.95%
corr(prod,q) 0.4819(0.5212) 0.1675(0.7504) 0.5537
Table 7: Sensitivity to A Slower Technological Pace (II): Means (std errors) of 1000
Simulated 87-quarter Samples. Deﬁnitions, measures and data sources are the same as
Table 4.
that slower technological progress magniﬁes the scarring eﬀect, weakens the
cleansing eﬀect, and magniﬁes the procyclical behavior of productivity.
This result can be explained as follows. First, slower technological
progress implies that the force of creative destruction is weak. A lower γ
weakens the technical disadvantage of old ﬁrms and allows both good ﬁrms
and unsure ﬁrms to live longer, so that less job destruction occurs at the
exit margins. A lower γ also implies a smaller cleansing eﬀect on average
labor productivity. A recession clears out marginal ﬁrms by shifting the
exit margins toward younger ages. The size of the shift is pinned down in
my calibration exercises by matching jdmax ≈ 11.6%. Given the shift of
exit margins, a slower technological pace shrinks the diﬀerence between the
vintages that have been killed and the ones that have survived, so that the
impact of the cleansing eﬀect on average labor productivity declines.
Second, when I assume a lower γ, I must also assume a higher p and a
lower ϕ to match the moments of job destruction. This re-calibration implies
a larger role for learning in job destruction: ﬁrms not only learn faster, but
also every period they learn, more learners exit as bad ﬁrms. It also gives
a larger scarring eﬀect on average labor productivity: a faster learning pace
implies a higher opportunity cost of not learning; a smaller prior probability
of being good suggests that learning has a greater marginal impact on cross-
type eﬃciency.
Table 7 reports the simulation statistics of 1000 simulated 87-quarter
samples when γ =0 .003. Results when γ =0 .007 and sample statistics
from data are included for comparison. My model with γ =0 .003 gen-
erates a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.4819 between detrended average labor
productivity and detrended output. This is a strong procyclical behavior of
my model with γ =0 .003 suggests that more job destruction comes from learning rather
than creative destruction.
36productivity and is close to the one suggested by data.
5C o n c l u s i o n
How do recessions aﬀect resource allocation? My paper suggests learning
has important consequences for this question. I posit that in addition to
the cleansing eﬀect argued by previous authors, recessions create a scar-
ring eﬀect by interrupting the learning process. They kill oﬀ potentially
good ﬁrms, shift resources toward bad ﬁrms and exacerbate the allocative
ineﬃciency in an industry. The empirical relevance of the scarring eﬀect is
examined in Section 4. Using data on U.S. manufacturing job ﬂows, I ﬁnd
that the scarring eﬀect dominates the cleansing eﬀect in the U.S. manufac-
turing sector from 1972 to 1993, and can account for the observed procyclical
productivity.
The scarring eﬀect stems from learning. Recessions bring a scarring eﬀect
by limiting the learning scope. Figure 3 of the paper provides intuition.
Recessions force ﬁrms to exit at earlier ages. The shortened ﬁrm life allows
less learning time, so that fewer truly good ﬁrms get to realize their potential
and the shaded area in Figure 3 would disappear. The decrease in the
fraction of labor at good ﬁrms implies a less eﬃcient allocation of labor
during recessions.
My paper highlights ﬁrm age as an indicator for the number of learning
opportunities. The existing empirical literature documents that ﬁrm age has
important explanatory power for micro-level job ﬂow patterns.33 My model
predicts that the mean and the dispersion of ﬁrm age both decline during
recessions, while the productivity dispersion within an age cohort goes up
on average. These are testable hypotheses with detailed data on the age
distribution of ﬁrms over the cycle.
The empirical relevance of the scarring eﬀect remains to be explored in a
wider framework. My calibration exercises have focused on the U.S. manu-
facturing sector, where job destruction is more responsive to business cycles
than job creation. However, Foote (1997) documents that in sectors of ser-
vices, ﬁre, transportation and communications, retail trade, and wholesale
trade, job creation is more volatile than job destruction. Would relatively
more responsive job creation hurt the dominance of the scarring eﬀect? It
could, since recessions leave “scars” by killing oﬀ potentially good ﬁrms on
the destruction side. It may not, because a larger decline in job creation also
33See Caves (1998) for an extensive review of recent ﬁndings on ﬁrm turnover and
industrial dynamics.
37introduces fewer potentially good ﬁrms on the creation side. Whether “scar-
ring” dominates “cleansing” in sectors other than manufacturing remains an
interesting question.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1 (three steps):
Step1: to prove that
V (θe,a;F,D)
∂a < 0:
Proof. Compare two ﬁrms with same belief θe,b u td i ﬀerent ages a1 >
a2.T op r o v e
V (θe,a;F,D)
∂a < 0,In e e dt os h o wt h a t
V (θe,a 1;F,D) <V(θe,a 2;F,D).
Suppose that the aggregate state is (F,D) at the beginning of period t0.
I assume there are n diﬀerent possible paths of demand realizations from
t0 onward, each with probability pi,w h e r ei =1 ,...,n. I also assume that
under the i’th path of demand realizations, the ﬁrm with a1 expects itself
to exit at the end of period ti
1 ≥ t0 and the ﬁrm with a2 expects itself to
exit at the end of period ti





























t (θe,a 1 + t − t0) is the expected proﬁt( o faﬁrm with current
age a1 and current belief θe)a tp e r i o dt ≥ t0 under demand path i.F i r m s






ditional on the realization of path i. Since price is competitive and ﬁrms are
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· pi.
T h e r ea r et h r e ep o s s i b i l i t i e sf o ra n yi.
Possibility 1, if ti
1 = ti
2 = ti:
since A(t0 − a1) <A(t0 − a2),
(t0 − a1)θePi
t (F,D) − 1 <A(t0 − a2)θePi
t (F,D) − 1
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Possibility 2, if ti
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Possibility 3, if ti
1 >t i
2:
39when it comes to period ti
2 under path i,t h eﬁrm aged a1+ti
2−t0 chooses
to stay and the ﬁrm aged a2 + ti
2 − t0 decides to leave. Based on the exit
condition, it must be true that,
V
¡




θe,a 2 + ti
2 − t0;F0,D0¢
< 0.
The ﬁrm aged a1 + ti
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and he expects those future proﬁts can cover any possible cost if demand
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,
the ﬁrm aged a2+ti
2−t0 should have expected even higher potential proﬁts




2 cannot be true.
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V (θe,a 1;F,D) <V(θe,a 2;F,D).
Step 2: to prove
V (θe,a;F,D)
∂θe > 0.
Proof. It is similar to the proof of
V (θe,a;F,D)
∂a > 0.





a(θe;F,D),f o rθe0 >θ e.
Proof. The existence of a(θe;F,D) is straightforward. Holding θe con-
stant, V (θe,a;F,D) is monotonically decreasing in a, then there must be
a(θe;F,D) such that
V (θe,a(θe;F,D);F,D) > 0
but
V (θe,a(θe;F,D)+1 ;F,D) ≤ 0.
And since
V (θe,a;F,D)






>V(θe,a(θe;F,D);F,D)=0holds for any θe0 >θ e.





PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 (three steps):
Proof. Step 1: to show that a steady state features time-invariant PtAt,
such that PtAt = PA, ∀ t, where Pt represents the equilibrium price and At
represents the leading technology in period t.
The condition of competitive pricing tells that:
Dt = Pt · Qt.














By deﬁnition, a steady state features constant level of demand, Dt = D (∀
t). and time-invariant ﬁrm distribution. Let f (θe,a) denote the number of
41ﬁrms with (θe,a) and ag , au denote the maximum ages for good ﬁrms and
unsure ﬁrms in operation, respectively. The above equation can be rewritten
as:























Hence, PtAt must be time-invariant. I let PtAt = PA.
Step 2: solve for ag − au by ﬁrms’ exit conditions.
At a steady state, the aggregate state {D,F} is perceived to be time-
invariant. Thus, good ﬁrms know they will live until ag, and unsure ﬁrms
know they will live until au. The time-invariant decision rules at the steady
state imply time-invariant value functions. Let V (θe,a) represent the steady-
state expected value of staying of a ﬁrm with belief θe and age a.
Since ag denote the maximum age of good ﬁrms in operation, and V (θg,a)
decreases in a monotonically, the condition of ﬁrm rationality suggests it










Similarly, exit condition for unsure ﬁrms suggest:
V (θu,au)=0
θuPA(1 + γ)
























(1 − β)(1+γ − β)
βag−au
(8)
42which can be re-written as:
F (ag − au)=G(ag − au)
Proposition 1 suggests that ag − au ≥ 0. To establish the existence of
ag − au ≥ 0 that satisﬁes the above equation, I need to show that F and G
cross each other at a positive value of ag − au.
G0 = −
pϕβγ






















θg < 1 by deﬁnition (θu = ϕθg +( 1− ϕ)θb and θg >θ b).
F (0) <G (0) suggests that the curve of F starts at ag − au =0below
the curve of G. F0 > 0 and G0 > 0 imply that both of F and G increase
monotonically in ag − au. F00 > 0 suggests that F is convex but G00 < 0
suggests that G is concave. Hence, F and G must cross once at a positive
value of ag − au, as shown in the following ﬁgure:
aa gu − 0
( ) Fa a gu −
() Ga a gu −
() F 0
() G 0
aa gu − 0
( ) Fa a gu −
() Ga a gu −
() F 0
() G 0
Therefore, (8) alone determines a unique value for ag − au.
Step 3, solve for f (0) and ag by combining the free entry condition and
the competitive pricing condition:
V (θu,0) = C (f (0))
43where f (0) represents the size of the entering cohort. With time-invariant




















where λ(θu,a) denotes the probability of staying in operation at age a as
an unsure ﬁrm, and π(θg,a) denotes the probability of staying in operation
at age a as a good ﬁrm. All-or-nothing learning suggests that:
λ(θu,a)=( 1 − p)
a for 0 ≤ a ≤ au,
λ(θg,a)=ϕ[1 − (1 − p)
a] for 0 ≤ a ≤ au,
λ(θg,a)=ϕ
h
1 − (1 − p)
au+1
i
for au +1≤ a ≤ ag
Plugging λ(θu,a), λ(θg,a) and PA=
(1+γ)ag
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θg back into (14) and applying the steady state



































ag − au has been given by (8). The left-hand sides of (16) and (17)
are both monotonically increasing in ag; The left-hand side and the right-
hand side of (16) are both monotonically increasing in f (0). Hence, with
au replaced by ag −(ag − au), (16) and (17) jointly determine ag and f (0).
Therefore, for any D, there exists a steady state that can be captured
by {f (0),ag,au}.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
44Proof. To prove that
d(ag)
dD ≥ 0 and
d(au)
dD ≥ 0 at the steady state,









































      


































      
      

     

= D
The left-hand is monotonically increasing in ag. Hence,
d(ag)
dD ≥ 0.W i t h





PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
Proof. Since rg =1−
(1−ϕ)
pϕau










Proposition 2 has established that
d(au)
d(D) ≥ 0. Therefore,
d(rg)























au is plotted in the following graph as a function of au.S i n c e
d
³




= −(1 − p)








2 = −(1 − p)
au · (ln(1 − p))
2 < 0,
45the curve is concave.
au
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au
Clearly, it indicates that x = au
1−(1−p)au =c o t ( θ).The concavity of the
curve suggests that as au increases, the angle of θ shrinks and cot(θ) in-
creases. Therefore, x increases in au.




logX0 =0 .1261 + 0.9653logX +0 .3246σa
recessions(logX):
σ0
a =0 .0079 + 0.0076logX +0 .8988σa
booms (σa):
logX0 = −0.1485 + 0.9291logX +1 .0317σa
recessions(σa):
σ0
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